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THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ARRANGEMENTS ON JOB 
QUALITY IN FRONT-LINE SERVICE WORKPLACES
VIRGINIA DOELLGAST, URSULA HOLTGREWE, and STEPHEN DEERY*
This paper analyzes the relationships am ong national institutions, collective bargain­
ing arrangem ents, and job  quality in call center workplaces, using establishment-level 
survey data obtained in 2003-2006 in five European coordinated m arket economies 
(CMEs) (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden) and three liberal m arket 
economies (LMEs) (Canada, the U nited States, and the U nited Kingdom). Overall, 
the authors find lower dismissal rates, m ore use of high-involvement m anagem ent 
practices, and less perform ance m onitoring in the CMEs, consistent with the notion 
that national institutions can influence em ploym ent practices even in m ore poorly regu­
lated service workplaces. However, workplace-level collective bargaining arrangem ents 
and in-house (com pared to outsourced) status also were associated with significantly 
h igher measures of job  quality across countries. Findings suggest that within CMEs, 
dual union/w orks council representation continues to provide im portant support for 
job  security, participation, and discretion, bu t that outsourcing can effect a partial 
escape from this institution.
T n the 1970s and  1980s, con tinen ta l Eu­
rope enjoyed both steady econom ic growth 
and  the  expansion  o f high-quality  jobs. 
Industry-level pay and  jo b  security agree­
m ents, strong em ploym ent protections, and  
broad co-determ ination rights p recluded the 
cost-cutting strategies pu rsued  in the U nited 
States and  U nited  Kingdom  and  encouraged  
investm ents in high pay and  worker skills. In 
recen t years, these national differences ap­
*Virginia D oellgast is L ec tu rer in C om parative Em­
ploym ent Relations at the L on d on  School o f E conom ­
ics; U rsula H oltgrew e is Sen ior R esearcher at FORBA 
(Forschungs- u n d  B eratungsstelle A rbeitsw elt), V ienna; 
an d  S tephen  D eery is Professor o f H um an  R esource 
M anagem ent at K ing’s College L ondon .
T he research  re p o rted  in  this p ap er was sup po rted  by 
the Russell Sage F oundation , the A lfred P. Sloan F ounda­
tion, the H ans Bockler S tiftung, th e  Social Sciences and  
H um anities R esearch C ouncil o f C anada, Forschungs- 
u n d  B eratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Jub ilaum sfonds d er 
O sterreich ischen  N ationalbank, the FWF Austria, the
pear to be eroding, as un ions lose m em bers 
and  in fluence and  as governm ents relax 
em ploym ent p ro tection  regulations. Today 
core sectors with strong un ions and  good 
working conditions are generating  fewer new 
jobs than  sectors w ithout these protections.
In this paper, we ask w hether national 
and  collective bargaining institutions can 
encourage m anagers in front-line service 
workplaces to ado p t em ploym ent practices
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associated with high-quality jobs, defined as 
jobs with low dismissal rates, opportun ities 
for participation  and discretion, and  lim ited 
perfo rm ance  m onitoring. We focus on call 
centers because they are a setting w here we 
m ight expect institutions to have weak effects 
on m anagem ent strategy. T he newness and 
m obility o f call centers, the ease with which 
calls can be shifted between locations, and 
the growing prevalence o f ou tsourcing have 
m ade it difficult for un ions to organize these 
workplaces (Shire, H oltgrew e, and  Kerst 
2002; H olst 2008). However, call centers are 
also often based in industries with a strong 
un ion presence, such as telecom m unications, 
and  they have been  the focus of bo th  recen t 
un io n  organizing efforts and  labor-m anage­
m en t partnersh ips on work reorganization 
(Doellgast 2008; Taylor and Bain 2001). They 
thus provide a good setting for exam ining 
how differences in bargaining arrangem ents 
within and  across countries affectjob  quality 
in new workplaces u n d er strong pressures to 
cut costs and  rationalize work.
T he analysis is based on survey data from  
five coo rd inated  m arket econom ies in con­
tinen tal E urope with strong labor laws and 
bargaining rights, extensive bargaining cover­
age, and  industry-level bargaining structures 
(A ustria , D en m a rk , F ran ce , G erm any , a n d  
Sweden) and  th ree  liberal m arket econom ies 
with weak labor laws and  bargaining rights, 
low bargaining coverage, and  fragm ented 
bargaining structures (the U nited  States, the 
U nited  Kingdom , and  C anada). First, we ask 
w hether m easures o f jo b  quality vary system­
atically betw een countries associated with 
liberal and  coord inated  m odels o f capitalism. 
Second, we analyze the relationsh ip between 
workplace-level collective bargaining institu­
tions and job  quality. H ere, we com pare union 
effects in liberal m arket econom ies with bo th  
works council and  un ion  effects in coord i­
nated  m arket econom ies—in o ther words, we 
exam ine the effects o f bargain ing structure 
ra th er than  ju s t un ion  presence. T hird , we 
ask w hether these institutional effects differ 
betw een in-house and  ou tsourced call cen­
ters. O utsourcing is a com m on strategy used 
to segm ent call cen ter work or to pursue a 
m ore cost-focused strategy, as it allows firms 
to avoid collective agreem ents or existing
com m itm ents to the work force (Walsh and  
D eery 2006); thus we m ight expect these 
workplaces to be the m ost likely place for 
convergence on low-quality jobs. Findings 
draw on data from  the Global Call C en ter 
Project (H olm an, Batt, and Holtgrewe 2007), 
which consists of identical establishment-level 
surveys o f 1,734 call centers in the countries 
investigated here.
Previous Research
Job  quality is typically viewed as consisting 
o f extrinsic or econom ic outcom es, including 
high pay an d jo b  security (Kalleberg, Reskin, 
and  H udson 2000; M cGovern, Sm eaton, and  
Hill 2004), and  outcom es th a t provide m ore 
intrinsic or ind irect benefits, including par­
ticipation in decision-making, discretion over 
tasks, and an absence o f detailed  m on ito ring  
and surveillance (Valverde, Ryan, and  G orjup 
2007; Tilly 1997; G reen 2005). Com parative 
researchers have a rgued  th a t these m easures 
o f jo b  quality are n o t simply a function  o f 
firm-level differences in strategy, technology, 
o r hum an capital, bu t also are in fluenced  by 
political and  econom ic institutions outside 
the firm. Studies in the 1980s and  1990s 
showed th a t m anufacturing firm s in liberal 
m arket econom ies, such as the U nited  States 
and U nited  Kingdom , were m ore likely to 
pursue Taylorist m odels o f work organiza­
tion associated with high turnover, narrowly 
designed jobs, and  intensive m onito ring , 
while similar firms in E uropean  coo rd ina ted  
m arket econom ies such as G erm any and  
Sweden invested in worker skills and  adop ted  
practices em phasizing in te rn a l flexibility 
(Lorenz 1992; Berggren 1992; Streeck 1984; 
T u rn er 1991; Wever 1995).
W hile there  is b road  consensus today th a t 
“national institutions m a tte r” for jo b  quality, 
researchers con tinue to debate exactly how 
they m atter, or the m echanism s th ro ug h  
which these institutions influence m anage­
m en t decisions. O ne group  o f theories 
associated with the com parative capitalism  
literature em phasizes the em beddedness of 
em ployer strategies in com plem entary  insti­
tu tions at the national level. E m ploym ent 
practices tha t rely on high skills and  w orker 
autonom y are viewed as one ou tcom e of
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national business systems or varieties o f capi­
talism, which encourage em ployers to adopt 
long-term  investm ent and  m arket strategies 
(Hall and  Soskice 2001; W hitley 1999). In 
contrast, political or power-based argum ents 
advanced by industrial relations theorists 
ho ld  tha t collective bargaining institutions 
play a central and  un ique role in outcom es, 
as they distribute bargaining power between 
differen t actors in the workplace and  in 
society. H igh jo b  quality in the coord inated  
m arket econom ies o f “social E u rop e” is thus 
explained by these cou n tries’ traditions of 
strong labor unions, which have used ex ten­
sive negotiating  rights and  high bargaining 
coverage to redistribute productivity gains 
to workers (T u rner 1991).
These two perspectives differ in the role 
each attributes to collective bargaining as 
a central governance m echanism  and  ex­
planation for cross-national variation in jo b  
quality. This distinction has becom e m ore 
m eaningful in cu rren t debates concern ing  
institutional change and  liberalization in Eu­
rope (Streeck and  T helen  2005). Studies o f 
work reorganization in the 1980s and  1990s 
were based prim arily on m atched case studies 
in export-oriented  sectors th a t were em bed­
ded  in national systems of com plem entary  
institutions and  th a t had  high bargaining 
coverage and  un ion  density. Today, collective 
bargaining arrangem ents are becom ing in­
creasingly heterogeneous within and between 
countries (Katz and  D arbishire 2000), and 
may be viewed as a m ore im m ediate obstacle 
to w idening m anagem ent prerogative than  
o th e r  co o rd in a tin g  in stitu tion s, such as 
inter-firm  relations (H oepner 2007). T he 
reach and  organization o f collective bargain­
ing is likely to be m ore uneven in service 
workplaces, which tend  to be new er and 
sm aller than  m anufacturing establishm ents 
and which typically have lower un ion  density 
and em ploy groups with low un io n  affinity, 
such as m inorities and  students (Dolvik and 
W addington 2004). U n der these conditions, 
are firms in coo rd inated  m arket econom ies 
m ore likely than  those in liberal m arket 
econom ies to adop t em ploym ent practices 
associated with high-quality jobs, regardless 
o f industry  segm ent or collective represen ta­
tion? O r are “good jo b s” prim arily a feature
of core workplaces in these countries with 
strong un ions and  works councils— in o ther 
words, is workplace-level collective bargaining 
a necessary condition  for the positive worker 
outcom es traditionally associated with the 
social E uropean  model?
We con tribu te  to these debates by com par­
ing the effects o f bo th  national and  collective 
bargaining institutions on em ploym ent prac­
tices in call centers—workplaces tha t have 
been  a focus of recen t efforts to restructu re  
and  segm ent custom er service and  sales 
in a variety of industries. In the following 
sections, we develop hypotheses based on 
the com parative capitalisms literature and 
power-based theories from  the industrial 
relations literature.
National institutions and job quality. Com ­
parative capitalism  scholars view national 
econom ies as consisting of distinct configura­
tions o f institutions th a t generate  o r support 
a particu lar “logic” o f action (Jackson and 
Deeg 2006:6). T he varieties of capitalism  ap­
proach , associated with the work of Hall and  
Soskice (2001), distinguishes between two 
groups o f national econom ies, based on the 
form s o f coo rd ination  used to solve transac­
tion cost problem s. In  coord inated  m arket 
econom ies, bank-based finance provides 
“patien t capital” for long-term  investm ents, 
stakeholder corporate governance systems 
su p p o rt cooperative labor relations, and  
organized vocational train ing provides high 
industry- o r firm-specific skills. Together, 
these institutions should support quality- 
focused strategies: firms have incentives to 
m ake long-term  com m itm ents to em ployees 
and  disincentives to exit from  these com m it­
m ents. In liberal m arket econom ies, the 
m arket plays a m ore central coord inating  
role in all o f these areas, encouraging m ore 
unilateral m anagem ent approaches and com ­
petitive strategies associated with cost-based 
com petition  and  high external flexibility.
O th er com parative capitalism  theorists 
view institutions as the resu lt o f nationally 
specific historical trajectories. According 
to this view, distinct national patterns of 
p roduction  m ethods and  vocational train ing 
d ifferen tia te coo rd inated  econom ies (Mau­
rice, Sellier, and  Silvestre 1986), and  varied
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labor law and  un ion  organization patterns 
differentiate liberal econom ies (Colvin 2006; 
G odard 2002). For exam ple, U.K. legislation 
on working time and em ploym ent protection  
is increasingly in fluenced by EU social d irec­
tives, which im pose em ployer constraints no t 
p resen t in the U nited  States.
Taken together, these theories p red ic t 
th a t em ploym ent practices associated with 
high-quality jobs will differ across countries, 
b u t disagree on the ex ten t o f convergence 
betw een countries characterized by m ore 
liberal o r coord inated  institutions. We m ight 
expect a g reater degree o f convergence in 
service firms, as they tend  to focus on national 
o r local m arkets, are less likely than  m anu­
facturing firm s to be covered by traditional 
vocational train ing and  collective bargaining 
institutions, and  are typically u n d e r strong 
pressures to reduce d irect labor costs, given 
lim ited substitutability by capital. However, 
th e re  is som e evidence o f cross-national 
variation in service m anagem ent practices. 
For exam ple, F inegold et al. (2000) found  
th a t G erm an hotels adop ted  m ore jo b  ro ta­
tion and  had  lower em ployee tu rnover than  
hotels in the U nited  Kingdom  and  U nited  
States, while Shire et al. (2002) and  Doell- 
gast (2008) found  th a t G erm an call centers 
designed jo bs m ore broadly and  m on ito red  
em ployees less intensively than  call centers 
in the U nited  Kingdom  and  U nited  States.
This suggests tha t we can expect varia­
tion in the quality o f call cen ter jobs at the 
national level, bu t tha t there  should be some 
systematic differences in outcom es between 
countries associated with coo rd inated  and  
liberal m arket m odels. Thus:
Hypothesis 1: Call centers in coordinated m arket 
econom ies will have lower rates of dismissal, 
greater use of high-involvement work practices, 
and lower perform ance m onitoring than those in 
the U nited States, while call centers in o ther liberal 
m arket economies will have practices similar to 
those in the U nited States.
Collective bargaining institutions and job 
quality. Political or power-based argum ents 
advanced by industrial relations scholars 
ho ld  th a t collective negotiations at the firm  
and  workplace level are a central m echa­
nism  th ro ug h  which national institutions
influence em ploym ent practices. This sug­
gests two m odifications to “national effects” 
argum ents. First, workplaces with collective 
bargaining institutions should have differen t 
outcom es from  workplaces w ithout those 
institutions. Second, w orker representatives 
in coord inated  and  liberal m arket econom ies 
should have d ifferen t resources for in fluenc­
ing the th ree  m easures o f jo b  quality we ex­
am ine here— dismissals, work organization , 
and  perfo rm ance  m onitoring.
In E uropean  coo rd inated  m arket econo­
mies, the s tructure  (n o tju s t the presence) o f 
collective bargaining in fluences bargaining 
power. A key feature o f industrial relations in 
these countries is the system of co-determ ina­
tion or consultation th ro ug h  works councils. 
L abor u n io n s’ p rim ary responsibility has 
traditionally been  to negotiate industry-level 
agreem ents on pay and working time with em ­
ployers associations, while em ployee-elected 
works councils negotiate firm- and  establish­
ment-level agreem ents on such practices as 
the in troduction  of perform ance-based pay, 
the in troduction  and  evaluation o f teams, 
and  the use o f m on ito ring  technologies. 
T he com bination  o f these workplace- and  
industry-level bargain ing structures was be­
lieved to create “productive constra in ts” th a t 
foreclosed strategies to com pete on the basis 
o f low wages and  high ex ternal flexibility in 
countries like G erm any (Streeck 1991). In 
recen t years, these boundaries have becom e 
increasingly b lurred : negotiations over pay 
and  working tim e have been  decentralized  to 
the establishm ent level across E urope due to 
the expansion of firm-level agreem ents and  
decline in bargaining coverage (Katz and  
D arbishire 2000), and  works councils’ ties 
with unions have weakened in many industries 
and  countries. As a result, workplaces are 
increasingly covered by d ifferen t com bina­
tions of un ion  and  works council agreem ents.
Each level o f  in te re s t re p re se n ta tio n  
should, in tu rn , have distinct effects on  jo b  
quality m easures. U nion agreem ents are 
often viewed as being encom passing w ithin 
coo rd inated  m arket econom ies o r at least 
as having substantial spill-over effects on 
o th er firms. Thus, un ions may have only 
weak effects on dismissals, as jo b  security is 
en h anced  by national em ploym ent p ro tec­
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tion legislation. T here  is also little reason 
to expect un io n  agreem ents to influence 
work design or perfo rm ance  m onitoring , as 
un ions typically do n o t have central respon­
sibility for negotiating  over these practices. 
In contrast, works councils may have a m ore 
d irect effect on all m easures o f jo b  quality, 
because they are typically responsible for n e­
gotiating agreem ents on  such issues as work 
redesign and  often play a role in approving 
or contesting h ire and  fire decisions.
These bodies thus have d ifferen t bargain­
ing roles and  rights th a t may influence ou t­
comes. However, the configuration o f un ion  
and  works council agreem ents should m ake 
the m ost crucial difference for bargain ing 
power. Close relationships betw een un ions 
and  works councils have been  viewed as im ­
p o rtan t in encouraging un ions to develop 
in d ep en d en t expertise to influence the con­
struction o f “best p ractices” at the firm  level 
(Belanger, Giles, and  M urray 2002). Works 
councils often rely on un ions to provide le­
gal and organizational resources, as well as 
to help coord inate the bargaining agenda 
across establishm ents in a firm  and  industry  
to foreclose com petition  for investm ent on 
the basis o f wages and  working conditions 
(Thelen 1991). This suggests th a t in coordi­
nated  m arket econom ies, collective bargain­
ing should encourage the use o f practices 
associated with good jobs; and, further, these 
effects should be strongest in establishm ents 
with bo th  a un ion  agreem ent and  a works 
council. Doellgast (2008) found  evidence 
o f this stronger “dual rep resen ta tio n ” effect 
on em ploym ent practices in G erm an call 
centers, which we expect to ho ld  across the 
coord inated  countries. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: In coordinated m arket economies, 
call centers with both a union and a works council 
agreem ent will have lower dismissal rates, greater 
use of high-involvement work practices, and lower 
perform ance m onitoring than centers with no 
collective bargaining institutions.
U nions in liberal m arket econom ies rely 
on firm- o r establishm ent-level bargaining 
structures and  have m ore d irect con tact with 
workers th rough a shop steward and grievance 
system. They negotiate overpay, benefits, jo b  
security provisions, and  due process, bu t they
do no t have form al rights to negotiate over 
the design of work and  com pensation . Thus, 
un ions have prim arily been  able to influence 
extrinsic aspects o f jo b  quality, such as jo b  
security. U nion presence has been  found  
to be negatively associated with dismissals 
in bo th  the U nited  States and  the U nited 
Kingdom  (Shaw et al. 1998:198; Cully et al. 
1999), which is often a ttribu ted  to strong 
and  institutionalized grievance procedures 
th a t provide a m echanism  for challenging 
arbitrary  decisions by m anagers.
In contrast, un io n  presence in liberal m ar­
ket econom ies has been  found  to have e ither 
no  effect or a negative effect on em ploym ent 
practices associated with intrinsic aspects o f 
jo b  quality, such as teamwork, work discretion, 
and  m onito ring  (Wood 1996). Most studies 
from  the U nited  States show th a t workers in 
un ion ized  workplaces are less satisfied than  
non-union workers with jo b  conten t, supervi­
sion, and prom otion opportunities. H am m er 
andA vgar (2005:243-44) sum m arized th ree  
possible explanations for these findings: first, 
unp leasan t jobs are m ore likely than  o ther 
jobs to a ttract unionization; second, m anage­
m ent may increase production  dem ands after 
un ionization  to com pensate for h igher labor 
costs; and third, unions may negotiate narrow  
jo b  classifications and  restrictive work rules 
th a t m ake it m ore difficult to im plem ent 
high-involvem ent practices. In com parative 
perspective, these outcom es may be a ttrib­
u ted  to the narrow  scope of bargaining rights 
in liberal m arket countries.
This suggests th a t collective bargaining 
will be associated with extrinsic ra th e r than  
intrinsic jo b  quality outcom es in liberal m ar­
ket econom ies:
Hypothesis 3: In liberal m arket economies, call 
centers with union agreem ents will have lower 
dismissal rates than those with no collective 
bargaining institutions. However, the work orga­
nization and perform ance m onitoring practices 
adopted by unionized establishments will not 
significantly differ from those adopted by the 
o ther establishments.
Outsourcing and job quality. Institutional 
effects also may vary across industry  seg­
m ents th a t differ with respect to in herited  
bargaining structures, level o f exposure to
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price-based com petition , and  degree o f em ­
beddedness in national systems o f corporate 
governance and  training. Subcontracting 
status, o r w hether firms handle calls in-house 
or subcontract this work to third-party provid­
ers, is one im p ortan t factor distinguishing 
call cen ter industry  segm ents. O utsourced 
suppliers are newer, m ore volatile firms tha t 
are less likely to be covered by collective 
bargaining agreem ents (H olm an, Batt, and 
Holtgrewe 2007).
T hree  characteristics o f this business seg­
m en t encourage the degradation  ofjob  qual­
ity and  p resen t d istinct challenges to worker 
representatives seeking to im prove w orkers’ 
jobs. First, ou tsourced firms are often u n d er 
substantial pressure to cut costs. A lthough 
a variety o f factors affect the decision to 
outsource, studies have found  th a t labor cost 
savings are often a central m otivation (H ar­
rison and  Kelley 1993). By subcontracting 
ou t work, organizations can take advantage 
of lower wage rates w ithout violating in ternal 
equity standards (Abraham  1990). Second, 
subcon tractors’ clients have an in terest in 
closely m o n ito rin g  su b co n trac to rs’ work 
force and  often require  the ou tsourced sup­
plier to m eet strict perfo rm ance standards 
(Walsh and  D eery 2006; Schonauer 2008). 
This can con tribu te  to work intensification, 
m ore rigid jo b  descriptions, and  less contro l 
over the tim ing and  m ethods o f work. T hird , 
ou tsourcing m aybe used to check the growth 
o f unions and to weaken the bargaining power 
o f workers by m oving operations outside 
the coverage o f collective agreem ents and 
“escaping” traditional legal and  negotiated  
constraints on  the em ploym ent relationsh ip 
(Pfeffer and Baron 1988; Doellgast and G reer 
2007; M arginson, Sisson, and  Arrowsm ith 
2003).
For these reasons, outsourcers are typi­
cally assum ed to create lower-quality jobs 
than  sim ilar in-house firms. This view has 
been  sup po rted  by several studies o f service 
workplaces. Grugulis, V incent, and  H ebson 
(2003) showed that subcontracting increased 
m on ito ring  and  decreased discretion across 
jo b  functions with different levels o f com plex­
ity. Batt, Doellgast, and  Kwon (2006) found  
th a t ou tsourced  call centers in the U nited  
States used m ore electronic m onito ring  and
had  lower pay and  discretion than  sim ilar in ­
house centers. In an employee-level study, 
Walsh and  D eery (2006) showed th a t the 
work force o f a call cen ter subcon tractor for 
an Australian airline had  lower pay, less jo b  
security, and  a less developed in te rna l labor 
m arket than  its in-house work force.
These conditions in tu rn  p resen t m ultip le 
challenges to un ions and  o th e r w orker rep ­
resentatives. U nion organizing is likely to 
require  high efforts for un certa in  rewards— 
leading to the paradox  th a t those groups o f 
workers with po o r jo b  quality who have the 
greatest need  for unions are least likely to have 
access to them  (Sydow 1997). O utsourced  
call centers typically have weaker collective 
bargain ing  institutions, and  have proven 
m ore difficult to organize in bo th  liberal and  
coo rd inated  m arket econom ies. In  Austria, 
the N etherlands, and  France, sectoral col­
lective agreem ents have been  negotia ted  for 
subcontractors, although with weak term s and 
conditions, while elsewhere, only a m inority 
o f these workplaces are covered by firm-level 
agreem ents.
T hus, we exp ect th a t o u tso u rced  call 
centers will be less likely to ado p t em ploy­
m ent practices associated with high-quality 
jobs in bo th  coo rd ina ted  and  liberal m arket 
econom ies:
Hypothesis 4: O utsourced call centers will have 
higher dismissal rates, m ore lim ited use of high- 
involvement work practices, and h igher perfor­
mance m onitoring than in-house centers.
In ad d itio n , we expect th a t bo th  national and  
collective bargaining institutions will have 
e ither weaker o r no  effects on  jo b  quality in 
ou tsourced call centers, due to the relative 
newness o f this sector and  its possible use by 
com panies to escape existing institutional 
constraints.
Methods
Sample
T he sam ple is drawn from  establishm ent- 
level surveys of call cen ter m anagers con­
ducted  in eight countries: Austria, D enm ark, 
F rance, G erm any, Sw eden, C anada, th e  
U nited  Kingdom , and  the U nited  States.
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Austria, D enm ark, France, Germany, and 
Sweden are all coo rd inated  m arket econo­
mies (CMEs) in n o rth e rn  and central E urope 
with high bargaining coverage, a tradition  o f 
industry-level bargain ing betw een em ployer 
and un ion confederations, and a com plem en­
tary system of works councils. Works coun­
cils in G erm any and  Austria have extensive 
co-determ ination rights over working time, 
paym ent m ethods, health  and  safety, and 
the in troduction  and  use o f equ ip m en t for 
m onito ring  employees. In D enm ark, works 
councils do n o t have legally p ro tec ted  co­
determ ination  rights, bu t they play a similarly 
in d ep en d en t role in rep resen ting  em ployee 
interests and  negotiating  over em ploym ent 
policies and  practices (j0 rgensen  2003). 
In  France, works councils have weaker co­
determ ination  rights, b u t typically play an 
im portan t consultation role, particularly with 
regard  to financial and  restructu ring  topics; 
and in Sweden, strong legal in form ation , 
consultation, and co-determ ination rights are 
exercised prim arily by labor un ions with the 
support o f works councils. As the character­
istics of collective bargaining in France and 
Sweden are distinct from  those in the o ther 
countries, we ran separate analyses excluding 
them . However, the key results with respect 
to bargaining structure effects were similar; 
thus, we include these countries for purposes 
of ex tending the scope and  generalizability 
o f findings.
In contrast, Canada, the U nited  Kingdom, 
and  the U nited  States are all liberal m arket 
econom ies (LMEs) with low bargaining cover­
age and prim arily firm- or establishment-level 
bargaining agreem ents (G odard 2002:251). 
W here un ions are present, they rep resen t 
em ployees th ro u g h  collective bargain ing  
on pay, em ploym ent security, and  seniority 
rights and th rough  a shop steward system that 
enforces con tract provisions. However, they 
have no form al rights to negotiate over work 
redesign, the in troduction  o f new techno l­
ogy, or the design of com pensation . W hile 
works councils are p resen t in the U nited  
Kingdom  and  have been  streng then ed  by a 
series of EU directives, they prim arily play a 
weak consultation role (Hall and Terry 2004).
These surveys were based on a com m on 
tem plate and  conducted  by separate coun­
try team s as p a rt o f the eighteen-country  
Global Call C en ter Project. Samples were 
drawn from  m em bersh ip  lists o f em ployers 
associations and industry associations in m ost 
countries, due to the lack o f official national 
statistics on  call centers. T he final sam ple 
included 1,734 establishm ents from  the eight 
countries, bu t this nu m ber was reduced  in 
the regressions to 1,441 (dismissals), 1,624 
(high-involvem ent work organization), and 
1,622 (perform ance m anagem ent), due to 
missing da ta .1 F u rth er in fo rm ation on sur­
vey procedures and  response rates for each 
country  survey is provided in the in troduc­
tion to this symposium (Batt, H olm an, and 
H oltgrew e).
Measures
Dependent variables. O ur d ep en d en t vari­
ables include th ree  m easures o f em ploym ent 
practices associated with jo b  quality: the
level o f dismissals, high-involvem ent work 
organization , and  perfo rm ance  m onitoring. 
T he dismissal rate measures the percentage of 
the core work force tha t was dismissed in the 
previous year. For the m ultivariate analyses, 
we used the square roo t o f dismissals, which 
p rod uced  a m ore no rm al distribu tion of the 
outcom e variable than  a log transform ation.
T he high-involvement work organization scale 
includes m easures assessing the degree to 
which work is designed to take advantage of 
employee skills and employee participation in 
decision-m aking. It includes the percentage 
o f core em ployees in self-m anaged teams, in 
offline teams, with fl exible jo b  descriptions, 
and  with access to flexible working arrange­
m ents. It also includes average em ployee 
discretion, m easured using six items: the 
level o f em ployee discretion over the daily 
work tasks em ployees perform ; the tools, 
m ethods, or p rocedures they use; the pace 
or speed at which they work; w hat they say to 
the customer; their lunch and break schedule; 
and  hand ling  additional custom er requests, 
m easured on a five-point L ikert scale.
!M eans an d  stan d ard  deviations fo r all variables at 
the co u n try  level are p rovided  in A ppend ix  E in the 
in trod uc tion  to this special issue (Batt, H olm an , and  
H oltgrew e).
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Performance monitoring employs eight-point 
scales, with values ranging from  “never” to 
“daily,” to m easure th ree  variables— how 
often em ployees are given statistics on per­
form ance, how often they are given general 
feedback on perform ance, and  how often 
supervisors listen to calls— and  a five-point 
L ikert scale to m easure the ex ten t to which 
perfo rm ance  in fo rm ation was used to disci­
pline employees. T he work organization scale 
(C ronbach’s alpha = 0.54) and  perform ance 
m on ito ring  scale (C ronbach’s a lpha = 0.64) 
were constructed  by taking the average of 
standardized z-scores for each variable. We 
selected the variables in each scale based 
on categories derived from  theory  and  past 
research, ra th e r than  by a ttem pting to isolate 
an underly ing com m on factor (Delery 1998). 
Thus, we do n o t assume tha t the practices 
are highly corre la ted  with one another, bu t 
ra th e r th a t when they are im p lem ented  to­
ge ther they likely signal a work env ironm ent 
th a t provides opportun ities for participation  
and  discretion.
We chose to analyze jo b  quality in term s of 
th ree  d ifferen t outcom es ra th e r than  as one 
aggregated scale for several reasons. First, 
past research  has found  tha t m anagers often 
a d o p t seem ingly co n trad ic to ry  p ractices 
aim ed at sim ultaneously prom oting  com ­
m itm en t and  cutting  costs. For exam ple, 
h igher task discretion is often com bined with 
work intensification and  po o r jo b  security 
(A ppelbaum  and  Batt 1994). These m ixed 
o r “hybrid” m odels may be particularly com ­
m on in service organizations, which face the 
potentially conflicting goals o f being bo th  
custom er-oriented and cost-efficient (Kor- 
czynski 2002). Second, un ions and  works 
councils have d ifferen t bargaining rights and 
form s o f bargain ing leverage over d ifferen t 
kinds o f m anagem ent decisions. Thus, by 
analyzing them  separately, we are able to 
distinguish betw een outcom es with stronger 
or weaker institutional effects.
Independent variables. We created  five indi­
cator variables to m easure different collective 
bargaining arrangem ents in CMEs and LMEs. 
T hese were coded as 1 or 0 for the following 
categories: workplaces in coordinated m arket 
econom ies (a) with bo th  a un io n  agreem ent
and  a works council, (b) with a works coun­
cil bu t no un ion  agreem ent, and  (c) with a 
un ion  agreem ent bu t no  works council; (d) 
workplaces in liberal m arket econom ies with 
a un io n  agreem ent; and  (e) workplaces in 
all countries with no  collective bargaining. 
N ational setting is based on coun try  indica­
tors. Subcontracting status is m easured as an 
ind icator variable, coded 1 if the call cen ter 
is op era ted  as an in-house firm  and  0 if it is 
a subcontractor.
Control variables. We control for differences 
in hum an capital, jo b  type, industry, and  
organizational characteristics tha t may affect 
the em ploym ent practices firm s adopt. An 
alternative explanation  for why some coun­
tries and  workplaces have h igh er jo b  quality 
than others may be tha t firms in those settings 
enjoy a m ore educated  pool o f workers, or 
have adop ted  a p roduction  m odel th a t relies 
on h igher overall skill levels. T hese factors 
may influence expected  re tu rns to invest­
m ents from  practices em phasizing w orker 
discretion or participation  and  thereby affect 
em ployers’ incentives to reduce transaction 
costs th rough , for exam ple, in te rna l labor 
markets or jo b  security arrangem ents (Becker 
1964). We include th ree  variables for aver­
age e d u c a tio n a l level o f th e  w ork  fo rc e — (a) 
schooling th rough  age 18, (b) schooling 
th ro ug h  university, and  (c) (the reference 
category) schooling th ro ug h  age 16 or no  
education— and one variable m easuring the 
nu m ber o f weeks it takes an average w orker 
to becom e proficient in the job .
Past research has found  th a t sales-focused 
service in te rac tio n s  are  associa ted  w ith 
greater individualization of work and  au­
tonom y as well as h igher em ployee b u rn o u t 
and  tu rnover (Batt 1999). Thus, we con tro l 
for centers in which the m ajority o f calls are 
ou tbound . We also con tro l for w hether the 
center prim arily serves large business custom ­
ers, as service com panies may adop t practices 
associated with high jo b  quality for em ploy­
ees servicing m arket segm ents th a t prom ise 
high re tu rns (Blutner, Brose, and  Holtgrewe 
2000). Two controls for industry  segm ent— 
telecom m unications and  banking— account 
for possible differences due to the history of 
strong regulation  in b o th  sectors. Finally, we
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND JOB QUALITY 497
include controls for organization size (total 
em ploym ent) and  age (num ber o f years since 
the cen te r’s establishm ent).
We experim en ted  with a nu m ber o f ad­
d itional con tro l variables in p re lim inary  
analyses, including o th er industry  sectors, 
w h e th er calls were p red o m in an tly  sales- 
focused, w hether the center served a national 
or in terna tional m arket, w hether the cen ter 
was p a rt o f a larger organization, and  initial 
and  ongoing training. However, as these 
did no t add substantially to the explanatory 
power o f the m odel, we om itted  them  from  
the final analysis.
Results
Collective bargaining structure. Table 1 shows 
the percentage o f establishm ents with differ­
en t collective bargaining arrangem ents in the 
in-house and  ou tsourced segm ents o f each 
country. R epresen tation  was m ore extensive 
in the CMEs, w here the m ajority o f call cen­
ters and agents had  collective agreem ents. 
However, th ere  were striking differences 
between countries in each group. Bargaining 
coverage was greatest in Austria, F rance, and 
Sweden— all countries in which the state or 
em ployers associations have secured some 
form  of m andatory  extension o f collective 
agreem ents. Sweden is un ique in having 
100% coverage of firms, although  in France 
a very high percentage of the work force in 
surveyed call centers (94%) is covered by a 
collective agreem ent. O utsourced centers in 
D enm ark and  Germ any had  m uch m ore lim­
ited representation than in-house workplaces, 
with less than half as many establishm ents and 
workers covered by agreem ents. Again, this 
may be due to the lack o f m andatory  exten­
sion m echanism s, as the gap is narrow er in 
Austria and  France, while in Sweden the cov­
erage o f agents in in-house and  ou tsourced 
operations is uniform ly high. In  addition , a 
h igher p rop o rtio n  of subcontractors in these 
countries are covered by works council agree­
m ents alone, while in-house centers are m ore 
likely to have dual bargain ing arrangem ents.
In two of the th ree  LMEs, call centers were 
poorly represen ted— only 12% of the work 
force in Canada and  16% in the U nited  States 
had  un ion  agreem ents—b u t in the U nited
Kingdom , alm ost half o f the establishm ents 
and  71% of the work force were covered by 
an agreem ent, similar to rates for D enm ark 
and  Germany. Moreover, whereas Canada 
and  the U nited  States had  negligible un ion  
presence in ou tsourced centers, the U nited  
Kingdom had higher coverage than D enm ark 
and  Germany, with 62% of agents covered by 
a un io n  agreem ent.
Determinants of job quality. Multivariate 
analysis enables us to test the relationship 
betw een the d ifferen t collective bargaining 
arran g em en ts  an d  jo b  quality m easures. 
Table 2 shows the m eans, standard deviations, 
and  correlations for all variables. T he shares 
o f observations by country  are as follows: 
Austria, 5%; D enm ark, 6%; France, 12%; 
Germany, 9%; Sweden, 8%; Canada, 22%; 
the U nited  Kingdom , 10%; and  the U nited 
States, 28%.
C orrelation  results provide prelim inary 
evidence th a t na tio nal setting, collective 
bargaining institutions, and  subcontracting 
status are associated with variation in jo b  
quality. T he presence o f b o th  a un ion  and 
a works council in CMEs was corre la ted  with 
all th ree  m easures o f high-quality jobs— 
lower dismissal rates, a g reater incidence of 
high-involvem ent work practices, and  lower 
perfo rm ance m onito ring—while o th er col­
lective bargain ing  a rran g em en ts  showed 
m ore m ixed results. In contrast, the presence 
o f a un ion  in the LMEs was only associated 
with lower dismissal rates. O utsourcing was 
corre la ted  with h igher dismissal rates and 
greater m on ito ring  in the full sample.
T he m ultivariate results for the rela tion­
ships betw een ou r in d ep en d en t variables 
and  the th ree  m easures o f jo b  quality are 
presen ted  in Tables 3-5. In each table, Model 
1 shows the results o f hierarchical regressions 
th a t test the effects o f national setting (Hy­
pothesis 1); M odel 2 adds variables m easuring 
collective bargaining arrangem ents in CMEs 
(Hypothesis 2) and  LMEs (Hypothesis 3); 
M odel 3 includes variables for subcontracting 
status (Hypothesis 4); and  M odel 4 presents 
the full m odel with hum an capital controls. 
We th en  perfo rm  separate regressions on the 
ou tsourced call centers, to exam ine w hether 
collective bargaining and  national institu-
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Table 1. Collective Bargaining Structure by Country and Subcontracting Status.
Obs.a
1
Union + WC
2
Only WC
3
Only Union
4
Some Form of 
Bargaining 
(Cols. 1-3)
5
% Workers 
with Some 
Form of 
Bargaining
CMEs
Austria 91 38.46 13.19 20.88 72.53 77.49
In-H ouse 57 54.39 15.79 14.04 84.21 84.41
O utso u rced 33 9.09 9.09 33.33 51.51 64.10
Denmark 118 38.95 10.53 11.58 61.05 72.01
In-H ouse 74 45.95 9.46 13.51 68.92 83.47
O utso u rced 21 14.29 14.29 4.76 33.34 35.00
France 210 62.20 16.75 8.13 87.08 94.22
In-H ouse 150 70.67 12.00 10.67 93.33 96.67
O utso u rced 59 40.68 28.81 1.69 71.19 90.10
Germany 153 22.52 23.18 3.31 49.01 76.33
In-H ouse 48 45.83 35.42 0.00 81.25 84.10
O utso u rced 100 11.00 16.00 5.00 32.00 42.45
Sweden 139 49.25 - 50.75 100.00 100.00
In-H ouse 102 51.96 - 48.04 100.00 100.00
O utsourced 32 40.63 - 59.38 100.00 100.00
LMEs
Canada 387 _ _ 16.19 16.19 11.90
In-H ouse 203 - - 21.18 21.18 17.92
O utso u rced 167 - - 8.38 8.38 8.02
U.K.C 167 - - 46.01 46.01 71.06
In-H ouse 120 - - 55.83 55.83 75.30
O utso u rced 43 - - 18.60 18.60 62.36
U.S. 464 _ - 9.09 9.09 16.00
In-H ouse 398 - - 10.30 10.30 20.53
O utso u rced 64 - - 1.56 1.56 1.04
aN um b er o f observations differs betw een the full d atase t an d  the in-house an d  ou tso urced  categories due  to 
m issing d ata  on  subcontracting  status.
bBased on  th e  to tal re p o rted  n u m b er o f full-time an d  part-tim e agents, includ ing  tem po rary  workers.
CU.K. call cen ters in o u r sam ple also had  works councils; however, we do n o t include th em  h ere , as o u r com parison  
focuses on  equ ivalen t form s o f collective b argain ing  betw een “co o rd in a ted  m ark e t” an d  “liberal m ark e t” countries.
tions are associated with jo b  quality m easures 
in these workplaces. T he reference group 
for collective bargaining effects is centers 
with no bargaining; and  the reference for 
coun try  effects is the U nited  States. We use 
left-censored Tobit analysis for dismissal rates, 
because tu rnover trun cated  at 0 (M addala 
1992), and  we use OLS regression for work 
practices and  perfo rm ance m onitoring.
Table 3 prov ides in fo rm atio n  on the  
factors affecting dismissal rates. First, pat­
te rn s at the  natio nal level do n o t show 
clear differences betw een CMEs and  LMEs. 
T he U nited  States had  significantly h igher 
dismissal rates than  all o ther countries. A
com parison of coefficients dem onstrates that 
while C anada had  h igher dismissal rates than  
Austria, France, and  Germany, the U nited  
K ingdom ’s dismissal rates were n o t d ifferen t 
from  those in m ost CMEs (with the exception 
o f A ustria), and  D enm ark had  significantly 
h igher dismissal rates than  Austria, France, 
and  Germany. Thus, the U nited  Kingdom  
and  D enm ark appear to be outliers in the ir 
respective groups. Second, collective bar­
gaining in fluenced outcom es in each g roup  
of countries: significantly lower dismissals 
were associated with the jo in t presence o f a 
un io n  and  a works council in the CMEs and  
with the presence o f a un io n  in LMEs. Lower
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Dismissal Rate (Sqrt) 1.57 1.74
2 HIWPs 0.04 -0.61 -0.28
3 Monitoring -0.07 0.69 0.35 -0.27
4 CME: Union &WC 0.18 0.38 -0.23 0.18 -0.25
5 CME: WC Only 0.05 0.23 -0.07 0.03 -0.13 -0.11
6 CME: Union Only 0.07 0.25 -0.11 0.17 -0.14 -0.13 -0.07
7 LME: Union 0.10 0.30 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09
8 Austria 0.05 0.22 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.08 0.14 -0.08
9 Denmark 0.06 0.23 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.14 0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.06
10 France 0.12 0.33 -0.20 0.08 -0.12 0.45 0.18 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09
11 Germany 0.09 0.29 -0.03 0.12 -0.16 0.04 0.24 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12
12 Sweden 0.08 0.27 -0.10 0.24 -0.18 0.25 -0.07 0.49 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09
13 Canada 0.22 0.41 0.08 -0.13 0.22 -0.25 -0.13 -0.15 0.08 -0.12 -0.13 -0.20 -0.17 -0.15
14 U.K. 0.10 0.30 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09 0.39 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.18
15 In-House 0.69 0.46 -0.16 0.05 -0.18 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.25 0.04 -0.17 0.03
16 Edu: <18 0.48 0.50 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.16 -0.14 -0.18 0.10 0.38 -0.13 -0.03
17 Edu: University 0.23 0.42 -0.14 0.14 -0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.38 -0.17 0.04 -0.13 0.04 0.11 -0.52
18 Wks to Be Proficient 18.64 17.72 -0.13 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.02
19 Inbound 0.79 0.40 -0.18 0.03 -0.17 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.33 0.02 -0.01 0.16
20 Large Business 0.21 0.41 0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.18
21 Telecom 0.21 0.41 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.09 -0.07
22 Banking 0.29 0.46 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.33
23 Employment (In) 4.01 1.36 0.31 -0.40 0.37 -0.07 -0.01 -0.19 0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.18 0.13 0.07 -0.12 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.06
24 Age (In) 2.32 0.68 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.07
Note: significant at p < .05 if value > .05.
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Table 3. U nstandardized Tobit Estimates for Dismissal Rates.
(standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Collective Bargaining
CME: U nion  8c WC -0.865** -0.687** -0.712** -1.142**
(0.339) (0.343) (0.340) (0.569)
CME: WC O nly -0.141 -0 .055 -0 .112 -0 .696
(0.400) (0.400) (0.397) (0.562)
CME: U nion  Only -0 .448 -0 .342 -0 .360 -1.398**
(0.435) (0.435) (0.432) (0.689)
LME: U nion -1.335*** —1.237*** -1.180*** -0 .490
(0.238) (0.239) (0.238) (0.555)
Country
A ustria -2.433*** -1.982*** -2.152*** -2.282*** -2.942***
(0.395) (0.476) (0.478) (0.480) (0.816)
D enm ark -1.238*** -0.882** -1.013*** -0.987** -2.189***
(0.321) (0.380) (0.382) (0.385) (0.716)
France —2.791*** —2.276*** —2.471*** -2.175*** -2.058***
(0.250) (0.373) (0.378) (0.384) (0.645)
G erm any -1.705*** -1.534*** -1.839*** -1.913*** -1.649***
(0.282) (0.314) (0.329) (0.334) (0.459)
Sweden —1 927*** -1.334*** -1.559*** -1.456*** -0 .748
(0.301) (0.468) (0.473) (0.473) (0.811)
C anada -0.910*** -0.811*** -0.951*** -0.840*** -1.537***
(0.191) (0.189) (0.194) (0.208) (0.409)
U.K. -1.876*** -1.413*** -1.507*** —1.374*** -1.772***
(0.257) (0.265) (0.266) (0.268) (0.495)
Subcontracting
In-H ouse -0.510*** -0.417**
(0.165) (0.165)
Human Capital Controls
Edu: <18 -0 .159 0.219
(0.185) (0.339)
Edu: University -0.617***
(0.218)
-0 .219
(0.430)
W eeks to Be Profic ient -0.012*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.007)
Continued
dismissal rates were also recorded  in in-house 
call centers; and  including subcontracting 
status in the m odel d im inished the size, bu t 
n o t the significance, o f the LME un io n  effect 
(M odel 3). In  ou tsourced centers, country  
effects were similar, with the exception o f 
Sweden, w here dismissal rates in ou tsourced 
centers were sim ilar to or h igher than  rates 
in the LMEs, and  D enm ark, where they were 
sim ilar to rates in the o ther CMEs. However, 
we find a d ifferen t p a tte rn  o f bargain ing ef­
fects: in CMEs, bo th  the com bined presence
o f a un ion  and  a works council and  the pres­
ence o f a un io n  alone were associated with 
reduced  dismissals, while un io n  presence 
had  no effect in LMEs.
Table 4 exam ines variables associated 
with the adoption  of high-involvem ent work 
practices. Again, there  was som e difference 
betw een CMEs and  LMEs, b u t this did n o t 
ho ld  for all countries. Call centers in Austria, 
Germany, and Sweden reported  a significantly 
h igher incidence o f these practices than  did 
the LMEs; however, France and  D enm ark
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Table 3. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Organizational Controls
In b o u n d -1.297*** -1.132*** -0.996*** -0.973*** -0.865***
(0.169) (0.171) (0.176) (0.176) (0.239)
Large Business 0.066 0.005 -0.021 0.056 -0 .365
(0.169) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.255)
Telecom -0.366** -0.368** -0.324* -0 .225 -0 .150
(0.180) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180) (0.331)
B anking -0 .185 -0 .114 -0 .108 -0 .097 0.003
(0.164) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.269)
E m ploym ent (In) 0.667*** 0.679*** 0.650*** 0.634*** 0.468***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.091)
Age -0.464*** -0.450*** -0.428*** -0.399*** -0.443**
(0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.192)
C onstan t 1.560*** 1.437*** 1.814*** 2.067*** 3.134***
(0.427) (0.430) (0.444) (0.458) (0.786)
N um ber o f O bservations 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441 419
X2 440.20*** 479.61*** 489.11*** 507.94*** 124.23***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
C hange in x 2 a 167.98*** 39.41*** 9.50** 18.83*** -
aC hange in x 2in M odel 1 is based on the ad d ition  o f co u n try  variables to a m odel with o rgan izational con tro ls only. 
* Statistically significant at th e  .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).
had  rates o f adoption  similar to those o f the 
LMEs. Collective bargaining effects again 
differ: the jo in t presence o f a un ion  and  a 
works council in CMEs was associated with a 
greater use o f high-involvement practices, bu t 
no  effects are found  for the lone presence o f 
e ither a un ion  or a works council in CMEs, or 
for un ion presence in LMEs. Finally, in-house 
centers did n o t use m ore of these practices, 
and  including subcontracting  status did no t 
significantly change the R-square (M odel 3). 
T he analysis o f the ou tsourced sam ple shows 
some differences in institutional effects. In 
Sweden, rates o f adoption  were sim ilar to 
those in the LMEs; and  in CMEs, use o f these 
practices was h igher in centers with a un ion  
agreem ent only, bu t n o t in those with ju s t a 
works council or dual bargaining.
T he th ird  m easure o f jo b  quality was per­
fo rm ancem onito ring  (Table 5). M onitoring 
was significantly lower am ong call centers in 
all CMEs and  the U nited  Kingdom  than  in 
the U nited States and  Canada. However, U.K. 
centers also had  significantly h igher rates of 
m onito ring  than  all o f the CMEs, with the 
exception o f France, which also had  h igher 
m onito ring  rates than  the o th er CMEs. Both
the U nited  Kingdom  and  France are thus 
outliers in their respective groups. Again, the 
com bined presence o f a un ion  and  a works 
council ag reem ent in CMEs was associated 
with lower rates o f perform ance m onitoring, 
while un ion  represen ta tion  in the LMEs had 
no effect. However, in CMEs, the presence 
of a works council alone also reduced  m oni­
to ring  rates, while un io n  presence alone had  
no effect. In-house centers used less per­
form ance m onitoring , and  the inclusion of 
subcontracting  status significantly increased 
the R-square value and  reduced  the size and 
statistical significance o f collective bargain­
ing effects (M odel 3). In the sam ple of 
ou tsourced centers, institutional effects were 
similar, although  France is n o t significantly 
d ifferen t from  the U nited  States or U nited  
Kingdom  and  the jo in t presence o f a un ion  
and  works council agreem ent in CMEs was 
no t associated with reduced  m onitoring.
Across the th ree  outcom e m easures, the 
addition of bo th  country indicators (Model 1) 
and  collective bargaining indicators (M odel 
2) significantly increased  the Chi-square 
for dismissals and  R-square for the o ther 
outcom es, suggesting th a t each set o f institu-
502 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
Table 4. U nstandardized OLS Estimates for High-Involvement Work Practices, 
(standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Collective Bargaining
CME: U nion  & WC 0.182*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.140
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.109)
CME: WC Only 0.072 0.067 0.084 0.034
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.111)
CME: U nion  Only 0.124 0.119 0.116 0.223*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.130)
LME: U nion -0 .032 -0 .038 -0.051 -0 .042
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.124)
Country
A ustria 0.257*** 0.139* 0.149* 0.199** 0.407***
(0.068) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.140)
D enm ark 0.009 -0.091 -0 .083 -0 .099 -0 .006
(0.065) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.150)
France 0.219*** 0.075 0.086 -0 .007 0.208
(0.047) (0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.139)
G erm any 0.320*** 0.249*** 0.267*** 0.313*** 0.371***
(0.054) (0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.101)
Sweden 0.490*** 0.327*** 0.338*** 0.301*** 0.197
(0.057) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.169)
C anada 0.025 0.023 0.032 -0 .014 0.118
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.091)
U.K. 0.065 0.075 0.080 0.042 0.049
(0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.112)
Subcontracting
In-H ouse 0.031 0.007
(0.034) (0.034)
Human Capital Controls
Edu: <18 0.091** -0 .004
(0.038) (0.072)
Edu: University 0 224*** 
(0.043)
0.134
(0.091)
W eeks to Be Profic ient 0.003*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Continued
tional variables con tribu ted  m eaningfully to 
im provedjob quality; the size and significance 
o f change in explained variance, however, 
were m ore substantial for the country  ind i­
cators. A n u m ber of the contro l variables 
were also statistically significant. T he hum an 
capital variables were strongly associated 
with h igh er jo b  quality across outcom es and 
increased the variance explained for bo th  
dismissals and  high-involvem ent practices 
(M odel 4). T he addition  o f hum an capital 
controls d id no t decrease the significance of
collective bargaining or country  effects on 
jo b  quality m easures, with one exception: 
the difference in dismissal rates betw een 
D enm ark and  the U nited  States declined  in 
significance w hen D enm ark’s h igh er hum an  
capital m easure was accounted  for. Taken 
together, these findings suggest th a t differ­
ences in outcom es betw een workplaces with 
d ifferen t collective bargaining arrangem ents 
or in d ifferen t countries are poorly explained 
by variation in education and training levels— 
although the variables used here  may also no t
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Table 4. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Organizational Controls
In b o u n d 0.093*** 0.068* 0.060* 0.054 0.130**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053)
Large Business 0.066* 0.070** 0.072** 0.051 0.070
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.054)
Telecom -0.032 -0 .045 -0 .048 -0.080** -0 .074
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.072)
Banking 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.026 -0 .028
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.058)
E m ploym ent (In) -0.150*** -0.153*** -0.151*** —0.147*** -0.129***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019)
Age 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.010 0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.041)
C onstan t 0.381*** 0.425*** 0.400*** 0.310*** 0.148*
(0.086) (0.087) (0.091) (0.093) (0.170)
N um b er o f O bservations 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 503
F Ratio 35.13*** 27.50*** 26.01*** 25.07*** 7.52***
R-Square 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24
Adj. R-Squared 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.21
F for C hange in R2 a 16.34*** 3.55*** 1.25 9.64*** -
aC hange in R2in M odel 1 is based on  the ad d ition  o f co u n try  variables to a m odel with o rgan izational con tro ls only. 
*Statistically significant a t th e  .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).
fully capture this variation. H um an capital 
m easures also had  e ither no  association or a 
weak association w ith job quality outcom es in 
the ou tsourced sample. T he organizational 
variables associated with h igher jo b  quality 
varied som ewhat across outcom e m easures; 
however, overall, smaller, older, in-bound 
centers appear to have offered “be tte r jo b s .”
Discussion
This study dem onstrates tha t differences 
in jo b  quality across call cen ter workplaces 
can be partially explained by national setting, 
collective bargain ing  arran gem en ts, and  
w hether call centers are subcontractors or 
operated  in-house. However, these effects 
vary across the th ree  outcom es m easured 
here: dismissal rate, high-involvem ent work 
practices, and  p erfo rm an ce  m on ito ring . 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, call centers in 
CMEs were m ore likely to adop t em ploym ent 
practices associated with high jo b  quality than 
were those in the U nited  States, while call 
centers in the o th e r LMEs were m ore similar 
to those in the U nited  States. However, there
were anom alies w ithin each group. D enm ark 
had  h igher dismissal rates than  several CMEs, 
while bo th  C anada and  the U nited  Kingdom  
had  lower dismissal rates than the U nited  
States. Call centers in D enm ark and  France 
showed m ore lim ited use of high-involvement 
work practices, sim ilar to the LMEs. Perfor­
m ance m onito ring  was h igher in France than  
in the o ther CMEs and  lower in the U nited 
Kingdom  than  in the o th er LMEs.
Some o f this variation may be due to 
established institutional differences at the 
national level. For exam ple, D enm ark is 
known for its un ique “flexicurity” m odel, 
characterized by weaker em ploym ent protec­
tions, high levels o f unem ploym ent insur­
ance, and  active labor m arket policies, while 
bo th  C anada and  the U nited  Kingdom  have 
stronger em ploym ent p ro tection  laws than  
the U nited  States. F rench industry  is also 
known for relying on a narrow er division of 
labor and  for having a weaker tradition  of 
d irect w orker participation  in m anagem ent 
decision-m aking than  G erm any or Sweden 
(see, for exam ple, Goyer 2006; M aurice, 
Sellier, and  Silvestre 1986). O ther differ-
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Table 5. U nstandardized OLS Estimates for Perform ance M onitoring, 
(standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Collective Bargaining
CME: U nion  & WC -0.237*** -0.174** -0.176** - 0.001
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.117)
CME: WC Only -0.265*** -0.232*** —0 247*** -0.382***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.119)
CME: U nion  Only - 0.111 -0 .079 -0 .079 -0 .123
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.140)
LME: U nion -0.097* -0 .058 -0 .047 -0 .154
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.133)
Country
A ustria -0.575*** -0.418*** -0.484*** -0.532*** -0.497***
(0.074) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.151)
D enm ark -0.519*** -0.384*** -0.439*** -0.408*** -0.566***
(0.071) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.162)
France -0.415*** -0.213*** -0.287*** -0.219*** -0 .246
(0.052) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.150)
G erm any -0.588*** -0.464*** -0.583*** -0.626*** -0.641***
(0.059) (0.068) (0.071) (0.072) (0.109)
Sweden -0.527*** -0.349*** -0.422*** -0.382*** -0.501***
(0.062) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.182)
C anada - 0.011 0.003 -0 .054 - 0.001 0.020
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.098)
U.K. -0.209*** -0.168*** -0.205*** -0.182*** -0.323***
(0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.121)
Subcontracting
In-H ouse -0.200*** -0.182***
(0.037) (0.037)
Human Capital Controls
Edu: <18 - 0. 111* * * -0 .150*
(0.041) (0.077)
Edu: University -0.170*** -0 .109
(0.047) (0.098)
Weeks to Be Profic ient -0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Continued
ences are m ore difficult to explain, such as 
the finding tha t call centers in the U nited  
Kingdom  use less intensive m onito ring  than 
those in C anada and the U nited States. Taken 
together, these findings suggest th a t a simple 
distinction betw een econom ic m odels does 
n o t capture the range of institutional factors 
th a t influence jo b  quality in these service 
workplaces: the U nited  Kingdom  is m ore 
sim ilar to con tinen ta l E uropean  countries 
than  to the U nited  States or C anada across 
several ou tcom es, an d  high-involvem ent
m anagem ent may be a feature o f only a few 
countries in E urope ra th e r than  a general 
characteristic o f CMEs. T he na tu re  of and  
explanations for these cross-national differ­
ences are best exp lored th rough  fu rth e r case 
study analysis.
Collective bargaining arrangem ents within 
each group  o f countries also had  d ifferen t 
effects across the th ree  outcom e variables, 
providing partial support for H ypotheses 2 
and  3. T he jo in t presence o f a un io n  and  
a works council ag reem ent in CMEs was as-
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Table 5. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Outsourced
Organizational Controls
In b o u n d -0.367*** -0.325*** —0.274*** -0.269*** -0.376***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.057)
Large Business -0.149*** -0.161*** -0.177*** -0.164*** -0.069
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.058)
Telecom -0 .064 -0 .053 -0 .035 - 0.011 -0 .099
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.078)
B anking -0.021 -0 .014 -0 .013 -0 .009 -0 .008
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.063)
E m ploym ent (In) 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
Age -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.082*** -0.075*** -0.139***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.045)
C onstan t 0.136 0.068 0.227** 0.313*** 0.486***
(0.094) (0.095) (0.099) (0.101) (0.183)
N um b er o f O bservations 1,622 1,622 1,622 1,622 502
F Ratio 49.01*** 38.98*** 39.14*** 35.00*** 13.00***
R-Square 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.35
Adj. R-Square d 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32
F for C hange in R2 a 34.98*** 3.07** 27.11*** 3.97*** -
aC hange in R2in M odel 1 is based on  the add ition  o f co u n try  variables to a m odel with o rgan iza tional con tro ls only. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).
sociated with lower dismissal rates, greater 
use o f high-involvem ent work practices, and 
lower p erfo rm an ce  m on ito ring , while in 
LMEs un ion  presence only affected dismissal 
rates. Thus, consistent with past research, 
ou r findings suggest th a t strong bargaining 
rights exercised th rough  dual represen tation  
in CMEs may encourage h igher levels o f par­
ticipation and  d iscretion (T urner 1991) and  
also may m ake it m ore difficult for em ployers 
to dismiss employees, possibly by providing 
additional m echanism s to challenge h ire and 
fire decisions. In LMEs, un ions play a m ore 
central role in providing protections from  
dismissals bu t do n o t have the bargaining 
rights o r power to influence work design.
We also found  some variation in the ef­
fects o f d ifferen t bargaining structures in the 
CMEs. Most notably, call centers with a works 
council alone adop ted  less intensive perfo r­
m ance m onito ring  bu t showed no difference 
in term s o f dismissals or work practices, while 
un ion  presence alone was n o t associated with 
any of the outcom e m easures. This is p rob ­
ably explained by the strong ability o f works 
councils in m ost E uropean  CMEs to block
invasive and  freq uen t perfo rm ance m onitor­
ing, based on their legal rights and traditional 
bargaining role, as well as the im portance this 
issue holds for workers (Doellgast 2008:312). 
Work design, in contrast, is n o t typically a 
m andatory  subject o f bargaining, and  thus 
may require  un ions to provide expertise, to 
exercise additional countervailing power, and 
to play a coord inating  role in negotiations. 
Certain issues in work design, such as team s 
and flexible working time, have been strongly 
backed by E uropean  un ions and  con tinue to 
shape their political agenda in the workplace.
A th ird  set o f findings concerns the effects 
o f  ou tsourcing on jo b  quality and  collective 
bargaining. O utsourced firms had  h igher 
dismissal rates and  m ore intensive perfo r­
m ance m onitoring , providing partial confir­
m ation of Hypothesis 4; however, they were 
n o t less likely to use high-involvem ent work 
practices. This presents a potentially con tra­
dictory picture, as we m ight have expected 
some trade-off betw een the two: em ployers 
th a t use m ore intensive m onito ring  should 
in tu rn  be less likely to invest in practices 
th a t requ ire  g reater em ployee involvem ent
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and  skill. O ur findings suggest tha t the two 
outcom es may instead be driven by differ­
en t organizational or strategic factors. It 
is likely th a t a h igher level o f m onito ring  is 
dem an ded  by an ou tso urcer’s clients who 
are in terested  in g reater transparency of 
perform ance results, bu t that these employers 
still experim en t with team  work and  flexible 
working arrangem ents to boost m otivation 
and  perform ance. In addition , inclusion of 
ou tsourced  status in the m odels dim inished 
the size o f un io n  and  works council effects 
on dismissals and  the size and  significance 
o f dual rep resen ta tion  effects and  un ion  ef­
fects in LMEs on perfo rm ance m anagem ent. 
This suggests th a t some of the variation in 
outcom es across call centers with d ifferen t 
bargain ing arrangem ents can be explained 
by the larger p rop o rtio n  of in-house centers 
th a t are covered by these arrangem ents.
We also were in terested  in exam ining 
w hether the relationships betw een institu­
tional con tex t and  jo b  quality found  in the 
full dataset held  for the subsam ple of subcon­
tractors, as one justification for outsourcing 
m aybe to avoid the constraints o f institutions 
such as strong un ion  agreem ents o r train ing 
obligations. First, the findings show a similar 
p a tte rn  of variation across countries, with 
generally h igher jo b  quality in the CMEs than 
the LMEs. T here  is thus no straightforw ard 
evidence o f cross-national convergence in 
subcon tractors’ em ploym ent practices, de­
spite the ir overall h igher dismissal rates and 
m ore intense use of perform ance m onitoring.
Second, collective bargain ing  was also 
associated with some variation in outcom es 
in ou tsourced call centers, although  here  
findings differed m arkedly from  those in 
the full dataset. Both dual bargain ing and 
a un io n  agreem ent alone in CMEs pred ic ted  
dismissals, while a un ion  agreem ent in LMEs 
had  no  effect. This may be due to weaker 
com pliance with em ploym ent p ro tec tio n  
rules in this sector, and  thus the need  for 
un ions to enforce the rules in ou tsourced 
workplaces in CMEs. In contrast, un ions in 
LMEs may have achieved weaker jo b  security 
provisions in subcontractors than in in-house 
firms. A particularly in teresting finding is the 
strong negative association betw een works 
council presence in CMEs and  p erform ance
m onitoring. This suggests tha t m onito ring  
is one key area in which works councils are 
able to use bargaining rights to influence 
outcom es in subcontractors, despite often 
being new er and  less experienced . Thus, 
while a sm aller p rop o rtio n  o f subcontractors 
was covered by collective bargaining, w here 
bargaining was p resen t in CMEs it appears 
to have m ade some con tribu tion  to h igher 
jo b  quality. However, the strongest m anifes­
tations o f bargain ing’s in fluence appear to 
have been reduced  dismissals and  curtailed  
surveillance ra th e r than  partic ipa tio n  in 
h igher-quality job design.
T he results should be viewed in the light 
o f lim itations in the data. First, sam ples 
were constructed  and  surveys adm inistered  
differently across countries (see Batt e t al., 
in this sym posium). This may m ean tha t 
some cross-national differences are due to 
the un ique characteristics o f the centers sur­
veyed. We have tried  to address this po ten tia l 
prob lem  by including a com prehensive set 
o f controls in ou r m odels, bu t this may no t 
account for o th e r sources o f sam pling varia­
tion. Second, questions concern ing  em ploy­
m ent practices may n o t capture differences 
in design and  im plem entation . T he history 
and  in terp re ta tion  o f self-m anaged team s 
and  flexible working arrangem ents differ 
across countries, and  form al practices may 
be im plem ented  differently in un io n  and  
non-union workplaces. Further analysis using 
m atched pair case studies would provide in ­
sights in to variation in substantive outcom es 
and the m echanism s th rough which collective 
bargaining influences m anagem ent practices 
in d ifferen t national settings.
Conclusions
U nions have traditionally been  am ong the 
m ost visible organizations working to improve 
jo b  quality in industrialized countries. Indus­
trial relations scholars have argued  th a t the ir 
success is linked to national labor laws and  
bargaining rights, which give them  resources 
to build countervailing power in negotiations 
and  thus to incorporate  stakeholder interests 
in firm s’ investm ent and  m anagem en t deci­
sions (T urner 1991). Comparative capitalism 
theories have treated  collective bargaining
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as one e lem en t o f national business systems 
or varieties o f capitalism , and  argued  that 
d istinct em ployer strategies in E uropean  
coordinated m arket econom ies are associated 
with g reater investm ents in em ployees (Hall 
and  Soskice 2001).
T he  find ings p re sen ted  h e re  prov ide 
evidence tha t the configuration o f national 
institutions in E uropean  coo rd inated  m ar­
k e t econ om ies prov ides in cen tives an d  
constraints th a t can encourage m anagers to 
adopt practices associated with higher-quality 
jobs, even in m ore poorly regulated  call 
cen ter workplaces. However, the strength  
and  presence o f collective bargaining ap­
pear to play an im p ortan t role within these 
countries in im proving worker discretion and 
participation , despite increasing variation in 
bargaining structures at the workplace level. 
O u tsourced  call cen ters provide a lower 
cost and  potentially a m ore flexible op tion  
for organizing jobs, b u t do n o t rep resen t a 
com prehensive escape from  regulation. At
the same time, ou tsourcing to som e ex ten t 
assists m anagem ent prerogative in bo th  co­
ord ina ted  and  liberal m arket econom ies, in 
the sense th a t bo th  the presence of collective 
bargaining and  its influence are m ore lim ited 
in these workplaces.
These findings have im p ortan t im plica­
tions for how governm ents and  o ther col­
lective actors approach  the expansion of 
service work. They suggest th a t a “high 
ro a d ” is possible, b u t may require  the active 
m ain tenance o f em ploym ent protections and 
bargaining rights. For unions, the news on 
these expand ing  workplaces is no t uniform ly 
good. A lthough un ions appear to retain  
some influence in line with established insti­
tu tional opportun ities and  constraints, they 
would be ill-advised to rely on the stability of 
these frameworks. Extending their influence 
in to  m ore cost- and  m arket-driven industry 
segm ents will requ ire  considerable creativity 
in adapting  traditional form s o f bargaining 
leverage to new challenges.
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